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PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE FOR
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
PLEADING INSANITY: THE
MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE

In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled that due process requires the state to make psychiatric expert assistance
available to indigent criminal defendants when insanity will be a
significant factor at trial. 1 Despite the directive of Ake, the
Court did not provide the states with implementation instructions. The opinion left several critical issues regarding delivery
of services unsettled or open to conflicting interpretation. Additionally, the Court did not preclude implementation approaches
that could seriously impair the utility of access to psychiatric
assistance for indigent defendants pleading insanity. 2 Problems
remain regarding the standards for adequate expert service and
sufficient financial support, the use of a threshold test to deter470 -U.S. 68, 83 (1985). In Ake, the Court held:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of
the offense is to be a significant factor at the trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct
an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.
Id. at 83.
For discussions of Ake u. Oklahoma and its implications, see The Supreme Court,
1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120 (1985) [hereinafter The Supreme
Court, 1984 Term]; Note, Expert Seruices and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The
Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326 (1986) [hereinafter
Note, Expert Seruices); Note, Criminal Procedure: The Constitutional Extent of the
Adequate Tools of a Defense, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 273 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Adequate
Tools]; Note, An lndigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake
v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Right to Assistance]; Note, Due
Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance]; Case Comment, Criminal
Law-The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Protection: A Preliminary Showing of
Insanity Requires the State to Prouide a Psychiatrist's Assistance, 11 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 211 (1985).
2. 470 U.S. at 83; Note, Expert Seruices, supra note 1, at 1342-62 & nn.113-220;
Note, Right to Assistance, supra note 1, at 970, 973; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric
Assistance, supra note 1, at 141-46, 155-56; Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 n.14, 1551 n.18 (1985).
1.
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mine the need for assistance, limits on a defendant's choice of
expert, and the nature of the expert's role. 3
The federal government and many states already provide psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants pleading insanity.•
Michigan's statutory scheme for delivering this service 11 presents
an opportunity to evaluate an approach that generally favors defendant interests in areas left unresolved by Ake. This Note undertakes that evaluation. Part I summarizes the Ake decision,
key problem areas, and the research methodology. Part II describes the Michigan statutory system. Part III evaluates that
system using data from interviews with legal and psychiatric
practitioners and considers the consequences of Michigan's approach to the issues posed by Ake. The evaluation shows that
Michigan's system places few impediments to an indigent defendant's access to psychiatric expert assistance, yet still avoids
the program and adjudicatory ill effects that might lead a jurisdiction to impose the restrictions apparently permitted under
Ake. Structural features of the Michigan system, such as the use
of the state-supported Center for Forensic Psychiatry to evaluate all defendants declaring an intent to plead insanity, and the
informal analytic and evaluation processes used by practitioners,
together focus public resources on a small set of cases and limit
the adjudicative impact of generally unrestrained access to psychiatric assistance.
I.

ISSUES AND RESEARCH PROGRAM

Although the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma
expanded the package of defense services available to indigent
defendants,6 the decision did not resolve all delivery of service
3. See authorities cited supra note 2.
4. 470 U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985); Note, Right to Assistance, supra note 1, at 965-67 &
nn.71, 74-83 (summarizing cases and statutes).
5. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987).
6. In Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985), the Court reviewed the defense services required by
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring state to provide trial transcript when
necessary for a decision on the merits of an appeal as of right); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252 (1959) (prohibiting fee requirement for filing of a notice of appeal of a conviction);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assuring assistance of counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (providing the right to counsel on the first direct
appeal as of right); and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (mandating that counsel's
assistance must be effective). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring state to pay for blood grouping tests for a
putative father in a "quasi-criminal" proceeding); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970) (recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel).
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issues with regard to psychiatric assistance in insanity cases.
The following discussion reviews the key areas that pose uncertainty for implementation of the right established by Ake. It
then describes the research methodology used to develop data
about Michigan's system for providing psychiatric assistance.
A.

Ake v. Oklahoma

The Supreme Court in deciding Ake v. Oklahoma found in the
Constitution a requirement to provide to indigent defendants a
service-psychiatric expert assistance when pleading insanity-that many states and the federal government already
made available through statute and case law. The Court's implementation instructions did not extend the constitutional right as
far as possible. Furthermore, the Court's language left uncertainty in several areas. The adequacy of service, the use of
threshold tests to determine whether a case presents sufficient
insanity issues to warrant expert assistance, the defendant's
right to select the expert, and the role of the expert in assisting
the defense present problems after the Ake decision and will
serve as the framework for analyzing the data collected for this
study.
1. The decision- In 1979, Glen Burton Ake and an accomplice entered an occupied home, bound and gagged the father,
mother, and son, and attempted to rape the twelve-year-old
daughter. Ake shot and killed the father and mother and
wounded the children. 7 Captured after an ensuing crime spree,
Ake confessed to the shootings. 8 His behavior at the arraignment
prompted the judge to have him examined for competency. 9 Less
than six months after the crime, a state _hospital forensic psychiatrist testified that Ake was psychotic and that his mental illness may have begun years previously. 10 The trial court denied
the defense request for an examination for sanity at the time of
the crime or for funds to secure an examination. 11
The jury then found Ake guilty on two counts of first degree
murder and two counts of shooting with intent to kill and sentenced him to death on the murder counts and to 500 years' im7. 470 U.S. 68, 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 71.
10. Id. at 71, 86.
11. Id. at 72.
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prisonment on each of the other two counts. 12 On appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Ake's claim that
as an indigent he had a constitutional right to the services of a
court-appointed psychiatrist. 13 In 1985, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Oklahoma should have provided Ake with access to psychiatric assistance. a
The Court determined that the trial court's reliance on .its decision in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 1 ~ ostensibly denying indigent defendants access to state-paid psychiatric assistance, was misplaced. 16 Decisions since Baldi had expanded
defendant rights to defense services, and Baldi had not in fact
limited defendant access to psychiatric services to the extent
supposed by the Oklahoma courts. Fundamental fairness now
required a different result. 17
To decide whether the state must provide psychiatric assistance, the Court applied the three part Mathews v. Eldridge 18
due process test for evaluating the need for additional procedural safeguards. The Mathews test considers the private interest at stake, the burden to the government of providing the additional safeguard, and the risk of error without the safeguard. 10
The Court declared "compelling" the private interest of accuracy in a proceeding threatening the defendant's life and liberty. 20 Noting that more than forty states and the federal government were able to provide psychiatric assistance to indigent
defendants pleading insanity, the Court dismissed the financial
burden and loss of strategic advantage to the state as not substantial. 21 Finally, the lack of psychiatric assistance for the de12. Id. at 73.
13. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
14. See supra note 1. At a new trial more than six years after the crime, psychiatrists
testified regarding Ake's mental state at the time of the crime. The jury found Ake legally sane and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. High Court Appellant Found
Guilty in 2d Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at A15, col. 1 (late ed.).
15. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). In Ake, the Court rejected Oklahoma's contention that Baldi
supported the proposition that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a
psychiatric examination to determine his sanity at the time of the offense. Instead, the
Court interpreted Baldi to require no more assistance than the defendant actually received in that case where two psychiatrists called by the defense and one called by the
court all testified. 470 U.S. at 85.
16. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84-85.
17. Id. at 76-77, 84-85.
18. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87.
19. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; The Supreme Court, 1984
Term, supra note 1, at 132-33; Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1332-33 & nn.4151; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 127-29.
20. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
21. Id. at 78-79 & n.4 (citing cases and statutes of 41 states).
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fendant in cases where insanity is likely to be an issue at trial
could lead to inaccurate results. 22 The Court thus decided that,
in appropriate cases, the state is constitutionally required to
provide psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants pleading
insanity. 23 Ake easily qualified for the required assistance. 2• The
Court limited its holding to cases like Ake's, which presented a
genuine insanity issue, because only those cases raised a risk of
erroneous adjudication if the state denied psychiatric
assistance. 211
2. Implementation issues- Ake v. Oklahoma leaves implementation to the states and does not resolve several important
delivery of service issues. 26 Policy choices in these areas can determine the extent to which indigent defendants meaningfully
participate in the judicial proceeding and realize the benefit of
the right announced in Ake.
a. Adequacy of expert service- The Court did not suggest
standards for assessing the adequacy of psychiatric assistance,
nor did the Court consider the links between the quality of service and program structure and funding. 27 Studies of public defender and appointed counsel programs have shown that underfunding, inexperience, lack of resources for investigation and
research, and excessive case loads can lead to legal services for
indigents so inferior as to raise questions of minimum adequacy. 28 Similar problems could plague the delivery of psychiatric services.
22. Id. at 78-83.
23. Id. at 74, 83.
24. Id. at 86-87.
25. Id. at 82.
26. Id. at 83; see supra note 2 and infra notes 27-59 and accompanying text.
27. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 145-46 & nn.17073.
28. N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 7-24, 56-59 (1982).
The decision to furnish counsel to the accused in criminal and juvenile cases is a
matter of federal constitutional right, not simply of grace. Yet, as documented in
this report, meaningful compliance with the Constitution is often absent due to
inadequate funding. Indeed, public defender and assigned counsel programs experience virtually every imaginable kind of financial deficiency. There are
neither enough lawyers to represent the poor, nor are all the available attorneys
trained, supervised, assisted by ample support staffs, or sufficiently
compensated.
Id. at 56; see Mounts & Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduction, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 193-201 (1986).
[T]he government creates and maintains defense systems which place restraints
on two crucial ingredients of competent representation: the time to handle each
case competently and the extrinsic resources for an adequate defense. As a result
of these systemic defects, many indigent defendants are being denied their right
to effective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 195; see also Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal
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Courts already evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and they might consider applying a parallel analysis to
psychiatric services. When courts assess defense counsel performance, they determine whether the incompetent performance
of counsel prejudiced the defendant by creating "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 29 If the courts
applied this standard to state provision of psychiatric assistance,
then, in all but egregious cases of state interference, the defendant would face the difficult task of proving that better expert
performance would have probably made a difference to the result. 30 Furthermore, case-by-case analysis often fails to confront
broad issues of financial support, organization, and overall quality. 31 Coupled with the lack of clear performance standards,
problems such as insufficient funding could prevent state-paid
psychiatric assistance from satisfying the promise of Ake.
b. Threshold need test for psychiatric expert assistanceUnder Ake, the defendant must convince the trial court that
sanity at the time of the crime is "likely to be a significant factor" in the trial before the state must provide access to psychiatric expert assistance for presenting an insanity defense. 32 Unfortunately, imposing a threshold test to establish the need for
psychiatric assistance presents interpretation and application
problems that can result in a court's failure to provide the assistance necessary to present an insanity defense effectively at
trial. 33
Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752,
776-77 & nn.139-49 (1980).
29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Strickland, the Court said
that by reasonable probability it meant that the errors had to "be sufficient to undermine confidence in the result." Id. at 694.
30. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 530-33 (11th
Cir. 1985) (evaluating prejudicial effect of the state not turning over to a psychiatric
expert evidence that the expert needed to complete an evaluation consistent with the
requirements of Ake); Note, supra note 28, at 776-78, 781.
31. Mounts, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 221, 222-23, 234-35 (1986); Note, supra note 28, at 775-79.
32. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). The Court stated: "When the defendant
is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely
to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is
readily apparent." Id. at 82-83. Elsewhere, the Court stated the test as "when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely
to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to
a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue." Id. at 74.
33. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1357-62 & nn.190-220; Note, Due Process
and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 141-43.
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Tests similar to the one endorsed in Ake, such as those employed by federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
have led to inconsistent results. 34 Ake's extreme behavior in
court, and the testimony of the state experts clearly indicating
that Ake was mentally ill prior to the crime, made the case a
relatively easy one for applying the threshold test. Thus, Ake
does not provide clear precedent that might resolve difficulties
in this area. 311 The uncertain nature of these preliminary determinations creates a risk of misjudgment and invites appeals. 36
These appeals can add cost and delay without affecting the final
outcome of the trial on the insanity issue-the result in Ake. 37
Ultimately, a threshold need test prevents some defendants
from obtaining resources necessary to assess and prepare an insanity test. Sometimes the defense has to argue that the defendant has a credible insanity plea just to obtain the resourc~s
necessary to investigate the legitimacy of the plea. The defense
might need expert assistance just to complete that task. 38 In a
close case, the expert is especially critical in evaluating and
presenting the defense. Yet, in that kind of case, the factual uncertainty of the defendant's insanity claim increases the likelihood for error in applying the threshold test. 39
The courts and states may impose the threshold test to try to
keep defense counsel from wasting time and public funds on
fishing expeditions for favorable evidence.4° Threshold need
tests can indeed save time and money, but they also create a risk
of trial court misjudgment that is difficult to overturn on ap34. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574, 600, 604, 608-14 (1982). At one
point, the Court used language similar to that of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, requiring provision of expert services to indigents when those services are "necessary for
an adequate defense." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), quoted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
Although the Court may have drawn its test more narrowly than that used in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, the Court's language will not avoid the difficulties experienced
under the Act, nor the problems created by requiring a threshold showing of need for
assistance. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1357-58.
35. See 470 U.S. at 86; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1,
at 142.
36. See authorities cited supra note 33.
37. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
38. Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647, 663 (1973); Note, Expert
Services, supra note 1, at 1361 & n.216; Note, Adequate Tools, supra note 1, at 285-86.
39. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 137-38 (1967).
40. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(d), at 488 n.38 (1985).
"Both courts and legislatures fear that, lacking this fiscal restraint, appointed counsel, if
given automatic access to experts, would use them for speculative inquiries based on the
slim hope that helpful evidence might somehow be uncovered." Id.; see Margolin & Wagner, supra note 38, at 663-64 & n.54.
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peal.4 1 Such misjudgments could have grievous consequences for
the defendant.
c. Selection of the expert- Ake follows many existing programs and the case law by declining to hold that the indigent
defendant has a constitutional right to select any expert the defendant wants.• 2 This limitation may be based on a fear of expert-shopping and of the use of blatantly biased d~fense experts."3 Nevertheless, by not granting the defendant the right to
pick any qualified expert, the Ake decision allows states to
str1lcture service delivery systems inimical to the defendant's
interests.••
A state could select the expert for the defendant or limit the
defendant's choice to a group of experts who might be hostile to
the insanity defense, or to the defendant's case, or inferior as
fo.rensic specialists. 0 Without clear standards for expert performance, saddling the defendant with this kind of expert would
seriously damage the defendant's ability to present an effective
insanity defense." 8 This constraint may not raise constitutional
issues, but it conflicts with Ake's emphasis on enhancing adjudicatory accuracy by providing the defendant with the resources
needed to participate meaningfully in the adjudicatory process.
d. The role of the expert- The Ake majority described the
psychiatric expert as a defense consultant who would assist with
the evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense-a
role that fits with that of a partisan expert. •1 The opinion may,
41. Decker, supra note 34, at 604.
42. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 40,
§ ll.4(a)-(b); Decker, supra note 34, at 611 & n.231; Note, An Indigent Defendant's
Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 500 (1984).
43. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1356 & nn.185-86 (citing Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1980)); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance,
supra note 1, at 152-53.
44. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 42, at 501 &
nn.139-45.
45. In Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985), a case decided after Ake,
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that court-appointed psychiatrists did not understand Indiana's statutory scheme relating to the insanity defense,
and that this lack of understanding caused prejudice that could have been avoided if the
trial court had provided the defendant with funds to hire his own expert. The courtappointed psychiatrists evaluated the defendant as legally sane. The Indiana court implied that the defendant's problem with the experts was based on their conclusions and
not on their competence. Under Indiana Code § 35-36-2-2, the experts testify after presentation of prosecution and defense evidence. IND. CoDE ANN. 35-36-2-2 (West 1987).
The court in the Palmer case viewed this system as providing "a more reliable factfinding basis than would a system in which both sides show up for trial with their own
'hired guns.'" 486 N.E.2d at 482.
46. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
47. · Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985).
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however, tolerate a reading that permits limiting the expert's
role to that of a neutral party directly serving the court. 48 Limiting the expert to a presumably neutral role is inconsistent with
the Ake opinion and can hurt the defendant.' 9
Ake appears to envision a strong defense role for the expert. 110
This approach raises bias problems regardless of the expert's integrity and honesty. 111 If the prosecution has its own expert, then
the lay fact finders, who possess no special medical or scientific
knowledge, must sort through competing expert testimony
orchestrated by the adversaries-the so-called battle of the experts. The persuasive skills of the rival experts could dominate
the fact-finding process. 112
The neutral expert model attempts to solve adequacy
problems, but is inconsistent with the adversary approach contemplated in Ake. 63 As the Supreme Court noted in Ake, psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis are prone to professional disagreement.11• Scientific and extra-scientific factors can lead to subtle
biasing that undermines reliability and validity. 1111 Systems that
use only allegedly neutral experts present to the fact finder an
illusion of intellectual neutrality, encourage excessive deference
to expertise, and place unwarranted power in the experts'
hands. 118 In closely contested cases, putting an expert with a hostile view of the insanity defense in a structurally neutral role
could devastate the defense. If that expert testifies that the defendant was legally sane at the time of the offense, the defense
faces a practically insurmountable hurdle. 117 At best the defense
could undermine the testimony of the neutral expert, a difficult
task without expert assistance. 118 In jurisdictions that require the
48. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1985) (discussed supra note 45); Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1347 & n.146 (citing cases); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 144.
49. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1346-55 & nn.135-83.
50. Id. at 1349-50 & nn.153-59.
51. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 1, at 136 & nn.35-39; Note, Due
Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 144 & n.164.
52. L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR. PSYCHIATRY, AUTHORITY AND LAW 1-21, 45, 5262 (1984); W. W1NSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA 3, 10-12, 18-20 (1983); Banks &
Poythress, The Elements of Persuasion in Expert Testimony, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
173-74 (1982).
53. See supra text accompanying note 47.
54. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
55. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1351 n.162; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 152-54 & nn.192-204.
56. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1350 & nn.160-61.
57. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1985) (discussed supra note 45); Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1354-55 & nn.172-82.
58. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1354 & n.178.
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defendant to prove legal insanity, the burden would be particularly onerous. In jurisdictions that place the burden of proof of
sanity on the prosecution, the defendant would still have to dispel a presumption of sanity. 119
B.

Research Issues and Methodology

The implementation issues presented by Ake form the framework for examining Michigan's system of providing psychiatric
experts to indigent defendants. 60 Interviews with Michigan defense attorneys, prosecutors, and psychiatric experts active in insanity cases provide the data for evaluating Michigan's approach
to these issues. 61
The interviewees are recognized by fellow practitioners as
leaders in the field. 62 The interviews concentrated on a core set
of issues pertaining to delivery of service. 63 During the study,
questions were modified to allow interviewees to comment on
initial findings. This procedure facilitated cross-checking of results and enabled the research to respond to the insights of
those most familiar with the subject matter. 64 The data does not
59. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 73 (1985); People v. McKeever, 123 Mich. App.
533, 536, 332 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1983).
60. See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text.
61. ·In-person interviews took place in Washtenaw and Wayne Counties in Southeastern Michigan. Defense attorneys from other parts of Michigan were interviewed by
phone. Thirteen attorneys, six clinicians specializing in forensic issues, and six court and
forensic services personnel were interviewed for this study. References to field notes from
these interviews use a letter code to identify the individuals with a page citation to relevant materials in the field notes. The interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law
Reform.
62. Each interviewee was asked to identify attorneys and clinicians who had participated in insanity defense cases or were considered knowledgeable in the field. Several
authors of articles on the insanity defense that appeared in Michigan legal publications
were also interviewed. A list of interviewees is on file with the Journal of Law Reform.
63. The interviews focused on the following issues: the process for securing criminal
responsibility evaluations and independent expert assistance; the selection of cases for
insanity defenses; the cost of service and the availability of funding; the amount of expert time involved in various kinds of cases; expert witness competency, persuasiveness,
credibility, and bias; attorney use and abuse of the system; the role of the expert; the
selection of the expert; the use of threshold tests; trial court discretion in the approval of
fees; the effect of witness testimony on adjudicatory results; and the effect of the Guilty
But Mentally Ill verdict as an alternative to the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
verdict.
64. See J. KATZ, PooR PEOPLE'S LAWYER'S IN TRANSITION app. at 197-218 (1982). The
methodology section describes a similar process used for analyzing data from open-ended
interviews and observational field data in a social science study of poverty lawyers in
Chicago. The flexible research agenda used in this study helps capture the intellectual
approaches of those who participate in the social process under study and who create the
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lend itself to quantitative summaries nor definitive assessments
of the system's overall effectiveness. Rather, it reflects practitioners' views of the psychiatric assistance program. These views
are critical to behavior within the system and to delivery of service to indigent defendants.

II.

MICHIGAN'S STATUTORY SYSTEM

This section reviews the performance of Michigan's system for
providing psychiatric expert assistance to indigent defendants
pleading insanity. First, it outlines the relevant substantive
criminal law. Then, it describes the statutory system for public
funding of psychiatric assistance in indigent defendant cases. Finally, it reports on the overall use and cost of psychiatric
services.
A.

The Insanity Defense

In 1975, the Michigan Legislature adopted the Guilty But
Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict in response to a highly publicized
murder committed by a released criminal, who previously had
been judged legally insane. 66 Under the statute, when a defendant raises an insanity defense, the fact finder must determine
whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense
and whether the mentally ill defendant was criminally responsible. 66 A defendant is not criminally responsible if, at the time of
the offense, due to mental illness or mental retardation that person "lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requiresocial reality the research describes. Id. In the present study, the interviewees know the
psychiatric assistance system well and are primary actors within that system. Through
their legal and clinical work, they shape the actual service given to indigent defendants.
Consequently, their understandings of how the system works are critical to the system.
Id. For an example of the use and description of a similar methodology for evaluating
attorneys representing children in divorce custody cases, see Note, Lawyering for the
Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from
Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1143-44 nn.76-80 (1978).
65. See 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 180 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 330.1400a,
768.29a(2), 768.36 (1979)); Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77, 78-85 & nn.7-38 (1982).
66. Boyle & Baughman, The Mental State of the Accused: Through a Glass Darkly,
65 MICH. B.J. 78, 80, 82 (1986); Project, supra note 65, at 85-86.
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ments of law."67 A defendant found mentally ill and not
criminally responsible receives a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict. A defendant found mentally ill but criminally responsible receives a GBMI verdict. 68 When found
NGRI, the defendant is committed to a state mental institution
and is to be released when he does not meet the standards for
civil commitment. 69 The GBMI defendant is to receive psychiatric treatment and serve the normal sentence for the offense. 70

B. Publicly Paid Psychiatric Assistance
The Michigan statute also established a process for evaluating
criminal defendants for mental illness and criminal responsibility and for providing publicly paid psychiatric assistance to indigent felony defendants pleading insanity. 71 To have the defendant evaluated for criminal insanity, defense counsel must submit to the court and the prosecuting attorney, not fewer than
thirty days before the date set for trial, a written notice of intent
to assert legal insanity. 72 Upon receipt of the notice, the court is
to order the Center for Forensic Psychiatry (Forensic Center) or
other qualified person to examine the defendant with regard to
the insanity claim. 73 Indigent defendants can then secure a
county-paid independent evaluation "by a clinician of his or her
choice," and that clinician "shall be entitled to receive a reason67. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.21a (1979). The statute defines mental illness as a "substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." Id. §
330.1400a.
68. Id. §§ 768.21a, 768.36(3).
69. Project, supra note 65, at 81-82 & nn.22-23.
70. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(3) (1979); Project, supra note 65, at 88-90 &
nn.48-50.
71. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987).
72. Id. § 768.20a(l).
73. Id. § 768.20a(2). The Forensic Center, an organizational unit of the Michigan Department of Mental Health, is a maximum security facility located in Ypsilanti. It was
established in 1966 to conduct pretrial competency hearings and to process persons
found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1128 (1979); Boyle &
Baughman, supra note 66, at 78 & n.7; Project, supra note 65, at 86 n.43. The psychiatric
clinic of the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit also performs criminal responsibility
evaluations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(9)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1987); DEPARTMENT
OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATE OF MICH., FORENSIC CENTER YEAR-BY-YEAR SERVICE DEMAND
SUMMARY (J. Romans ed. 1987) [hereinafter FORENSIC CENTER SERVICE DEMAND SuMMARY). Michigan law defines qualified personnel to include personnel of the psychiatric
clinic of the Recorder's Court of Detroit and those meeting the standards determined by
the Department of Mental Health. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(9)(a) (West Supp.
1987).
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able fee as approved by the court."'• The prosecution may also
obtain an independent evaluation. 711 The statute requires the Forensic Center and the independent clinician to submit written
reports to defense counsel and the prosecutor. These reports
must state the clinical findings, the facts upon which those findings are based and an opinion "on the issue of the defendant's
insanity at the time the alleged offense was committed and
whether the defendant was mentally ill or mentally retarded at
the time the alleged offense was committed. " 76 Michigan does
not employ a threshold need test for psychiatric assistance, the
defendant can select any qualified clinician to serve as the independent expert, and the expert can act as a defense consultant. 77

C. Overall Program Use and Cost
Few Michigan defendants raise the insanity defense. Even
fewer receive the NGRI verdict. After the 1975 statutory creation of the GBMI verdict, the annual number of NGRI verdicts
dropped from fifty-six in 1975 to thirty-two in 1976 and has not
gone above eighty-two since. 78 These numbers are small compared to the annual number of arrests and the number of criminal responsibility evaluations completed each year. 79
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). Although poverty lines
provide guidance, no formal income standards for determining indigency exist, and the
trial court must use its discretion to decide whether a defendant qualifies for publicly
paid defense services, such as appointed counsel. Interview with Mr. Lloyd Powell, Public Defender, Washtenaw County, Mich. (Jan. 22, 1987) [hereinafter Powell interview].
Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. Neuhard, Free Counsel: A
Right, Not a Charity, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 109 n.3 (1986) (citing articles "detailing the virtual impossibility of establishing uniform and simple indigency
guidelines."). "[C]urrent eligibility criteria are so arbitrary and unworkable that determination of the availability of free counsel is either pro forma, or, when meaningfully pursued, too costly." Id. at 109. Various estimates indicate that about two-thirds of all felony defendants will be classified as indigent. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at
1326 n.3. Public defenders are "the primary defense service providers for about 68% of
the Nation's population." WASHTENAW COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 1985-86
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1986).
75. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987).
76. Id. § 768.20a(6)(c).
77. Id. § 768.20a(3).
78. FORENSIC CENTER SERVICE DEMAND SUMMARY, supra note 73. The annual number
of GBMI verdicts has remained below 51. Id.
79. The annual number of criminal responsibility evaluations for the entire State rose
from 401 in 1976 to 1102 in 1980. From 1981 to 1986, the annual number has ranged
from a low of 1067 in 1982 to a high of 1389 in 1985. Id. Between 1975 and 1982, the
number of males arrested ranged from 191,857 to 263,513 annually. Project, supra note
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In the overwhelming majority of cases resulting in the NGRI
verdict, the Forensic Center evaluated the defendant as not
criminally responsible, and; at a bench trial, the prosecution did
not contest that conclusion. 80 The Forensic Center evaluates the
defendant as not criminally responsible in about ten percent of
its criminal responsibility evaluations. 81 Rarely does the defendant secure the NGRI verdict when he argues the issue at trial
after the Forensic Center has evaluated the defendant as criminally responsible. 82
Excluding overhead costs, the Forensic Center spends
$1,080,000 annually for criminal responsibility evaluation-at an
average cost of $1,100 per evaluation. 83 Complex or contested
cases require additional effort and public resources. 84 The Forensic Center does not budget on a per case or per hour basis, so
the cost of these cases is not readily available. 811
Statewide data on the number of indigent defendants relying
on public funds to obtain an independent evaluation of legal insanity is not available. 86 Forensic Center clinicians testify for the
prosecution on the insanity issue in about fifty trials annually. 87
In these cases, they will usually face an independent expert. Not
all such cases involve indigents; thus, the public will not have
65, at 107 app. A, Table A, 90 n.53, 92-93 & nn.67-70. See Caplan, Annals of Law: The
Insanity Defense, THE NEw YORKER, July 2, 1984, at 45, 51, 69.
[l]n 1978-the latest year for which national data on the insanity defense are
available-almost a third of American households were touched by crime, and
forty million people were victims. Ten million suspects were arrested, and about
three-fifths of them were charged; approximately two-thirds of those pleaded
guilty. Only sixteen hundred and twenty-five of the defendants successfully
pleaded insanity-roughly one-tenth of one per cent of the presumed offenders
who stood trial.
Id. at 51. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 146 n.174.
80. Project, supra note 65, at 94-95, 108 app. A, Tables C & D.
81. Interview with Dr. Charles Clark, Director of Clinical Services, Forensic Center
(Feb. 18, 1986) [hereinafter Clark interview]. Not all Forensic Center NGRI recommendations result in NGRI verdicts. In 1979, only 50% of the NGRI recommendations led to
NGRI verdicts. Since then, the number has been closer to 70%. Id. Interview notes are
on file with the Journal of Law Reform.
82. Project, supra note 65, at 97 & nn.110-11, 113 app. A, Table L.
83. Interview with Mr. Dan Jeromin, Administrative Officer, Forensic Center (Feb.
13, 1986) [hereinafter Jeromin interview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of
Law Reform.
84. Clark interview, supra note 81.
85. Jeromin interview, supra note 83.
86. Interview with Ms. Marilyn Hall, State Court Administrator's Office (Jan. 22,
1986) [hereinafter Hall interview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law
Reform.
87. Clark interview, supra note 81.
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paid for the expert in all fifty cases. 88 No data are available indicating how often the defense will receive funds for an independent evaluation and then not pursue the insanity issue at trial. 89
As required by statute, Michigan counties provide funds for
hiring independent psychiatric experts. 90 In Washtenaw County,
funds are allocated to the Public Defender, who maintains a
budget line for expert services. 91 In other counties, defense counsel asks the court to reimburse the doctor. 92 Usually, the court
authorizes a funding level that conforms to a standard fee schedule for expert services. The court then considers additional
funds as the expert's time commitment increases. 93 The willingness of trial courts to grant additional funds varies and can create funding problems for defense services. 94
In 1986, the Michigan Supreme Court submitted to the Governor a budget request for state funding of the trial courts. 911 The
proposal called for $806,056 for witness fees, to include psychiatric experts for indigent defendants. This figure represents the
total amount spent by all Michigan counties for all defense expert services, including psychiatric assistance. The dollar
88. See sup.ra note 74. Although only 36.2% of the GBMI defendants, 23.8% of the
NGRI defendants, and 27.9% of those evaluated by the Forensic Center and found
guilty were employed at the time of arrest, one cannot assume that all defendants pleading insanity were indigent. Project, supra note 65, at 95 n.90, 110 app. A, Table G. When
the defense used an independent expert only, the prosecution matched the independent
expert with Forensic Center testimony. When the Forensic Center found the defendant
not criminally responsible, the defense would use that testimony. If the defense did not
use Forensic Center testimony, the Forensic Center had probably evaluated the defendant as criminally responsible. Id. at 108 app. A, Table D.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 121-26.
90. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987); infra text accompanying notes 97 -98.
91. Powell interview, supra note 74. The Public Defender has approximately $8,000
annually available for psychiatric experts. These funds have been adequate in recent
years.
92. Attorney J at l; Attorney K at 2; Clinician F at 5.
93. Attorney E at l; Attorney F at 2-4; Attorney H at 1, 3; Attorney K at 2; Clinician
A at 11; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 1, 4-5.
94. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
95. In 1980, the State Legislature passed 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 438 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.9947 (West 1987)), providing for state funding of Michigan's trial
courts and allowing for state funding of expert witness fees, including the costs of evaluations and trial testimony by independent psychiatric experts participating in insanity
defense cases. The Legislature has not, however, appropriated funds to implement this
program of state support for the trial courts. Hall interview, supra note 86; Interview
with Ms. Barbara Levine, Office of Michigan Assigned Appellate Counsel (Feb. 17, 1986)
[hereinafter Levine interview]. The Michigan Attorney General has opined that the statute does not bind the Legislature as far as funding and that the failure to fund the trial
courts does not compel termination of funding for other courts, such as the 36th Judicial
District, which is funded by the State. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. 38.
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amount certainly exceeds the amount the counties spend for
psychiatric experts used by indigent defendants pleading
insanity. 98

III.

EVALUATION OF THE MICHIGAN SYSTEM

Michigan generally takes an expansive approach to publicly
paid psychiatric assistance for the indigent defendant. The interview data indicate few problems in securing assistance, but
the requirement of Forensic Center evaluation, jury skepticism
toward the insanity defense, the availability of the GBMI verdict, funding limitations, and the professional concerns of practitioners constrain the impact of the service. The data did not
show that Michigan's lack of restraint in the issue areas
presented by Ake v. Oklahoma has resulted in the kinds of
problems that might cause a state to take a more cautious
approach.
A.

Availability and Adequacy of Service

The evaluation looks at the process for making service available and considers the adequacy of the service delivered. Both
are crucial for determining program effectiveness.
1. Availability- The interview data indicate that Michigan
courts comply with the statutory requirements of referring defendants to the Forensic Center and providing for independe:n.t
expert assistance at public expense. 97 Services are more readily
available than before the enactment of the federal system under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 when service was only sporadically available. 98
Defendants may use the expert services system by simply declaring an intent to plead insanity, yet only a small percentage
of those arrested ever enters this system. 99 A screening process
96. Hall interview, supra note 86. The Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit spent
$12,600 for psychiatric expert services in 1985 for all purposes, including, but not limited
to, insanity defense cases. In 1985, psychiatrists appeared in 38 Recorder's Court cases.
Interview with Mr. George Gish, Court Administrator (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter Gish interview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law Reform.
97. Attorney B at l; Attorney H at 1; Attorney K at 2; Attorney M at 1; see supra
notes 83-93.
98. Lewin, lndigency-lnformal and Formal Procedures to Provide Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 lowA L. REV. 458, 485 (1966).
99. See supra note 79.
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eliminates cases from the expert services system. This process
reduces the likelihood that indigent defendants will take advantage of the psychiatric expert assistance program and pointlessly
increase costs while distorting the fact-finding process.
a. Defense counsel- Defense counsel faces substantive and
strategic issues when deciding, in consultation with the defendant, whether to secure expert assistance and pursue an insanity
defense. 10° Counsel's yiew of the key factors in this decisionmaking helps determine the extent to which indigent defendants use
the psychiatric expert assistance system and the influence of expert assistance on adjudication.
Defense counsel will not use independent psychiatrists and
the insanity defense simply because the state makes these tools
available. 101 The difficult task of winning an NGRI verdict inhibits pursuit of insanity pleas. Usually, the defense argues insanity only when the prosecution already has a strong case that
the defendant committed the criminal act. 102 The adverse effects
of negative Forensic Center evaluations,1°3 the availability of the
GBMI verdict, 10' and negative jury attitudes toward legal insanity,1011 especially given the often violent nature of the crimes
involved, 108 tend to work against the defendant. Furthermore, an
insanity plea complicates the work of the defense attorney. 107
Although some public defenders and appointed counsel try these
cases effectively,1°8 others are not effective, and the added difficulty and time commitment combined with the low probability
of success further deter the use of insanity pleas. 109 Presentation
of groundless insanity defenses can jeopardize credibility with
trial judges, a valuable commodity for effective advocacy, particularly for defense attorneys who appear regularly before a par100. Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 10. The decision to plead not guilty is personal
to the defendant, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 11.6, but the use of insanity as
an affirmative defense may fall within the scope of defense counsel's control of strategy.
In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Court held that appellate counsel may use
his professional judgment to decide which claims are strong enough to present on appeal
despite the defendant's desire to pursue other nonfrivolous claims.
101. Attorney C at 3, 6; Attorney D at 4; Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 5; Attorney
G at 7-10; Attorney I at 8-9; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K at 1.
102. Attorney E at 2; Attorney I at 9.
103. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
107. Attorney F at 5; Clinician F at 5.
108. Clinician B at 4.
109. Attorney F at 4 (stating that there is no money in it for counsel); Clinician E at
3; Clinician F at 1-2, 5.
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ticular court. 11° Consequently, attorney self-interest often discourages insanity pleas.
Before having a psychiatrist evaluate the defendant, defense
counsel assesses the case for a potential insanity defense. m Defense attorneys say they evaluate the defendant's character,
mental history and involvement with the mental health community, behavior at the time of the crime, and the crime itself,
before supporting an insanity plea and requesting a Forensic
Center criminal responsibility evaluation. 112 These attorneys
view themselves as reasonably expert at recognizing the defendant's faking mental disturbances. us Although the defense attorneys do not view their appraisals as ultimately valid, they
rely on them for the initial decision to explore an insanity defense. 114 Defense attorneys recognize their limitations in this
area, and, when they have sufficient resources available, they
seek expert evaluation even before referral to the Forensic
Center. 116
The type of crime and the way it was committed also affect
the decision to pursue the insanity defense. Usually the defense
raises insanity in the most serious cases-those involving major
felonies, major sentencing ramifications, and acts against people. us The perceived irrationality of the crime-in terms of its
impulsiveness, emotionally charged character, and the apparent
lack of defendant motivation-correlates with NGRI verdicts in
cases where the Forensic Center has evaluated the defendant as
criminally responsible. 117 Defense attorneys and the psychiatric
community understand the linkage between NGRI verdicts, the
character of the crime, and the defendant's prior behavior. They
110. Attorney B at 1; Attorney F at 2-3; Attorney G at 9; Attorney I at 7 (reporting
that courts will decline assigning counsel additional cases).
111. Attorney Cat 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 1, 7-10; Attorney Kat 1; Clinician Bat 5.
112. See authorities cited supra note 111.
113. Attorney G at 8, 10.
114. See authorities cited supra note 111.
115. Attorney B at 1, 6; Attorney C at 1-2; Attorney D at 3; Attorney G at 12-13;
Attorney H at 6; Attorney K at 1, 4; Clinician E at 6; see infra text accompanying notes
144-46.

116. Attorney B at 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney E at 1. Two-thirds of the cases submitted for Forensic Center evaluation to determine criminal responsibility involve crimes
against persons. Project, supra note 65, at 112 app. A, Table K. Experience in other
jurisdictions indicates a different result. "[l]n some jurisdictions offenses like forgery,
shoplifting, car theft, and other forms of larceny represent the vast majority of crimes of
which defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity." Caplan, supra note 79, at
69.
117. Clark & Howard, When Courts and Experts Disagree: Discordance Between Insanity Recommendations and Adjudications, 9 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 385, 392-93 (1985).
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may take this linkage into account when selecting cases for insanity defenses, 118 helping to limit the group of cases in which
insanity is argued and .expert services are used.
Forensic Center clinicians and other observers do not believe
that all defense requests for criminal responsibility evaluations
originate in a sincere desire to explore insanity. They suggest
that defense attorneys often obtain Forensic Center evaluations
just to delay the trial or frustrate the prosecution. 119 Nevertheless, at least one Forensic Center clinician concedes that about
three-fourths of the criminal responsibility evaluations raise legitimate issues. 120
When the Forensic Center evaluates the defendant as criminally responsible, defense counsel can advise the defendant to
abandon the insanity plea, or may request funds for an independent evaluation, 121 despite its heavy burden of neutralizing the
Forensic Center to gain an NGRI verdict. 122 The data do not
disclose how often the defense drops the insanity plea at this
stage, but it happens. 123 When the defense continues with the
insanity plea, an independent expert sometimes finds the defendant criminally responsible. 124 Under the statute, the prosecution receives the expert's report. 126 If counsel goes ahead with
an insanity defense, the defendant's own expert can become an
adverse witness. The probability of successfully countering a Forensic Center clinician's testimony for the prosecution then becomes strikingly low, 128 effectively discouraging further consideration of an insanity defense.
Practitioners understand that deciding not to pursue an insanity defense poses issues regarding effective assistance of
counsel and professional responsibility. 127 Courts have declared
mistrials due to ineffective assistance of counsel upon failure to
plead or adequately prepare an insanity defense when the defendant's behavior-such as attempted suicide-a finding of incompetence to stand trial, or evidence of a history of mental ill118. Clinician C at 3; see infra note 214.
119. Attorney G at 9, 11; Attorney I at 9; Clinician A at 1, 9; Clinician B at 5; Clinician D at 2, 6; Judge A at 1.
120. Clinician B at 5.
121. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987); People v. Anderson,
112 Mich. App. 640, 317 N.W.2d 205 (1981); infra note 129; see also infra notes 148-49.
122. See supra text accompanying note 82.
123. See infra note 129.
124. Attorney D at 2.
125. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(6) (West Supp. 1987); see Attorney Fat 4.
126. See infra note 149.
127. Attorney A at 5; Attorney E at 2; Attorney I at 7; Attorney M at 4.
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ness suggested a possibility of legal insanity. 128 Defense counsel
does not have an absolute duty to investigate and pursue an insanity defense in every possible case, and defense attorneys correctly believe that they can use their professional judgment to
assess the facts and make a reasoned decision whether to pursue
the defense. 129 A Forensic Center evaluation of the defendant as
criminally responsible, for example, supports not taking any further action in pursuit of an insanity defense. 130
Without an absolute duty to have defendants evaluated for
criminal responsibility, or to pursue the defense beyond a negative Forensic Center evaluation, counsel can give full weight to
the factors that argue against pleading insanity. By applying
these factors, defense counsel plays a central role in removing
defendants from the expert services system and reserving services for a small subset of the defendant population.
b. Trial courts- The state statute directs the trial court to
grant a defendant's request for Forensic Center evaluation and
appointment of an independent expert. 131 Interviewees did not
report any cases where the trial judge denied these requests. 132
128. See People v. McDonnell, 91 Mich. App. 458, 460-61, 283 N.W.2d 773, 774
(1979) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel was aware of the
defendant's psychiatric history, including hospitalization, and its bearing on charged offense, but failed to investigate and consider seriously the possibility of an insanity defense); People v. Bryant, 77 Mich. App. 108, 110, 258 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (1977) (concluding that counsel's failure to arrange for criminal responsibility evaluation was
inexplicable in light of the defendant's mental history, attempts to commit suicide, and
initial declaration that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial); People v.
Tumpkin, 49 Mich. App. 262, 265-67, 212 N.W.2d 38, 39-40 (1973) (finding facts that
warranted the entry of an insanity plea based on defense counsel's knowledge of the
defendant's history of instability, attempted suicide, Forensic Center diagnosis of the
defendant as psychotic, and trial testimony that the defendant was psychotic, had a fragile hold on reality, heard voices, and suffered religious delusions).
129. People v. Parker, 133 Mich. App. 358, 262-63, 349 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1984) (declining to hold that defense counsel failed to properly prepare an insanity defense when
the defendant had no history of mental problems, potential lay witnesses testified as to
the defendant's mental state even though they were not listed in notice of insanity defense, and an expert witness for the defense testified that the defendant was responsible
for his behavior); People v. Blue, 114 Mich. App. 137, 142-44, 318 N.W.2d 498, 500-01
(1982) (holding that defense counsel's tactical decision not to assert an insanity defense
was reasonable based on psychiatric testimony available to the prosecution, including
Forensic Center reports that the defendant had no substantial mental deficiency after he
had initially been found incompetent to stand trial); People v. Anderson, 112 Mich. App.
640, 645-46, 317 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1981) (deciding that defense counsel's decision not to
pursue an insanity defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel where the Forensic
Center examination found no past or present signs of mental illness and counsel could
have concluded "that an insanity defense was not the best tactical choice").
130. Anderson, 112 Mich. App. 640, 317 N.W.2d 205; see supra note 129.
131. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987).
132. One judge felt he had discretion in this area, but he took the position that fairness to the defendant and defense counsel required him to honor requests for Forensic
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The State Appellate Defender's Office is unaware of any appeals
based on judicial unwillingness to approve evaluation at the Forensic Center or appointment of an independent expert. 133 An
appellate court has, however, considered the issue of whether a
particular type of expert fits within the statutory description, 134
and a trial court has denied funds needed to retain a clinician
with specialized knowledge about a particular syndrome. 1311 Certain individuals have been excluded from testifying based on the
trial court's judgment that they lacked the necessary expertise
in evaluating people for criminal responsibility. 138 Otherwise, the
appointment of a psychiatric expert is automatic. 137
The trial court has the power to approve the award of a reasonable fee to the independent expert. 138 Coupled with funding
problems faced by some county court systems, 139 judicial discretion regarding the size of the expert's fee affects the quality of
service. Low fees reduce experts' expenditure of time on a case
and discourage participation by some top quality experts. 140
c. The Forensic Center and the evaluation process- The
Forensic Center evaluates all defendants pleading insanity. 141
Usually, the Forensic Center finds the defendant criminally responsible.142 In most indigent insanity cases, the Forensic Center
evaluates the defendant before the defense obtains any evaluaCenter evaluations and authorization of independent experts. Judge A at 2-3. Even the
one defense attorney who suggested that courts rely on attorney good faith when they
know the attorney has a decent reputation and apply a higher standard when they do
not know the attorney did not report any cases where access to the expert was explicitly
denied. Attorney B at 1.
133. Attorney I at 1-3.
134. Attorney L at 1-2. In People v. Dumont, 97 Mich. App. 50, 294 N.W.2d 234
(1980), the court determined that a neurological examination satisfied the statutory requirement that the public pay for an expert to examine the defendant as to the underlying medical basis for an insanity defense. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(3) (West
Supp. 1987). The court accepted the prosecution's argument that the decision to appoint
a neurologist was within the discretion of the trial court, but concluded that the trial
court had abused that discretion.
135. Attorney K at 2 (complaining that a trial court would not approve additional
money to bring in an out-of-state expert on Post-Vietnam Stress Syndrome); Attorney L
at 2 (observing that courts are reluctant to appoint an expert when the defense advances
a legal theory that is not well recognized in the law).
136. People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 133, 362 N.W.2d 787, 792 (1984).
137. Attorney L at 1-3.
138. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987).
139. Gish interview, supra note 96. County court systems generally establish a standard fee schedule for various kinds of expert services. These standard fee schedules can
act as limits on the expert's fees. Clinician A at 3.
140. See infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
141. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(2) (West Supp. 1987).
142. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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tion by an independent expert. 143 Defense attorneys with adequate re~ources follow a different procedure. They obtain an independent evaluation before referral to the Forensic Center. 14 '
Then, the defense receives expert psychiatric advice early in the
process and can make strategic decisions without declaring an
intent to enter an insanity plea. In these cases, the Forensic
Center does not perform the initial evaluation and start a process of building a professional consensus that the defendant is
criminally responsible. 1411 Immediate independent evaluation
shortens the time between the offense and the evaluation of the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, reducing
the possibility that the defendant's behavior will stabilize and
become less demonstrative of the state of mind needed for an
insanity defense. 146
,
Defendants will rarely receive an NGRI verdict when the Forensic Center has found the defendant criminally responsible-its typical finding 147-even when the independent expert
finds the defendant not criminally responsible. 148 When the independent expert concurs with the Forensic Center finding, as
sometimes occurs, the defendant faces an almost fatal problem.
The prosecution has access to the expert's report, leaving the
defense with an extremely weak substantive and strategic basis
for arguing insanity. 149 Indeed, once the Forensic Center enters
143. Attorney D at 2; Attorney F at 5; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K at 1; Attorney M
at 1.
144. Attorney Bat 1, 6; Attorney Cat 3; Attorney D at 3; Attorney G at 12-13; Attorney H at 6; Attorney K at 1; Clinician E at 6.
145. Attorney B at 1-2; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 3-4; Attorney H at 6.
146. Attorney D at 3; Note, Due Process Concerns with Delayed Psychiatric Evaluations and the Insanity Defense: Time ls of the Essence, 64 B.U.L. REV. 861, 871-73 &
nn.49-60 (1985).
147. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
148. Clinician A at 2; Clinician B at 2; Clinician F at 3; Blunt & Stock, Guilty But
Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 49, 61-62 (1985); Project,
supra note 65, at 103-04; see Clark & Howard, supra note 117, at 394. In 1979, the
Forensic Center evaluated 864 defendants as criminally responsible. Only 14, or.1.63%,
of these defendants were adjudicated NGRI. Id. at 386. An evaluation of cases in which
the Center's recommendations varied from adjudicatory results showed that defendants
evaluated as criminally responsible but adjudicated NGRI "committed offenses which
were likely to be impulsive, emotionally charged, or without apparent motivation." Id. at
394. These defendants differed from defendants adjudicated culpable "both in their history of psychiatric treatment and in the frequency of prior findings of incompetency to
stand trial." Id. The study did not assess the effect of attorney skill or of defense experts. Id. These factors surely affect the outcome, but not wholly independently of the
character of the crime and the defendant's background. Attorney B at 2-3; Project, supra
note 65, at 97-98.
149. The defense could use a hy witness, Attorney D at 6, but would still have to
contend with an adverse evaluation by a clinician initially selected by the defense. Attorney B at 1-2; Clinician E at 5; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(6) (West Supp.
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its usual finding of criminal responsibility, the small prospect for
eventual defense success discourages the defense from seeking
public funds for an independent expert, particularly in marginal
cases. 1110 The Forensic Center serves as a constant check against
potential defense exploitation of the insanity defense in qµestionable cases.
d. Jury attitudes- Jury attitudes also disfavor insanity defenses. Jury hostility toward the insanity defense depresses the
number of NGRI verdicts,m the use of the insanity defense, and
the retention of publicly paid psychiatric experts regardless of
the lack of statutory impediments to the use of these experts. 1112
Jury skepticism regarding expert witnesses may encourage
jury members to disregard expert witness testimony. 1113 If the
jury disregards the experts, the defense has a weak case. Technically, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion on the issue
of legal sanity,m but in most insanity cases, the defense has
conceded that the defendant committed the criminal act, and
jury attitudes may force the defense to do more than simply offer evidence contrary to that presented by the prosecution. The
defense may have to get the jury to see the case the way the
defense expert sees it, and not simply raise a doubt about the
defendant's criminal responsibility. m Thus, the jury presents a
formidable hurdle for the defendant and operates as a check on
the expert witness. 1116 This difficulty presents one more obstacle
1987); People v. Parker, 133 Mich. App. 358, 349 N.W.2d 514 (1984); supra note 129; see
also supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
150. Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 5.
151. Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 3-4.
152. Attorney B at 2; Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 5; Attorney G at 5, 11; Attorney
H at 3; Attorney I at 5, 9; Attorney K at 3-4; Clinician C at 3; Clinician E at 4; Clinician
Fat 3-4.
153. Attorney A at 3-4; Attorney B at 2; Attorney E at 1-2; Clinician C at 2.
154. People v. McKeever, 133 Mich. App. 533, 536, 332 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1983);
Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 80.
155. Attorney G at 5; Attorney K at 3-4; Clinician F at 4; see supra note 152. But see
Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 85-86. They argue that in People v. Murphy, 416
Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152, appeal denied, 418 Mich. 956, 344 N.W.2d 6 (1983), the
court undermined the jury's freedom to disregard expert testimony of insanity when the
court held that under a sufficiency of the evidence standard, appellate courts can weigh
the evidence, determine credibility, and find the defendant NGRI when all the experts
testify that the defendant is not criminally responsible. They object to this alleged usurpation of the jury's fact-finding function given the "highly questionable competence" of
experts to make these determinations. Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 86; see also
People v. John, 129 Mich. App. 664, 667, 341 N.W.2d 861, 863 (1983) (substituting a
NGRI verdict for a GBMI verdict where the only two psychiatric experts who participated testified that the defendant was not legally sane).
156. Judge A at 1; see also supra notes 151-53.
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to the objective of obtaining an independent clinician and arguing insanity.
e. The GBMI verdict- The Michigan Legislature's enactment of the GBMI verdict may have diminished the perceived
usefulness of the insanity defense. m Although the GBMI verdict
is not a compromise verdict on the effect of mental illness on
criminal responsibility, fact finders use it that way, 1118 possibly to
satisfy the desire to keep dangerous criminals off the streets. 1119
The GBMI verdict further discourages insanity defenses because
the GBMI sentencing regime sometimes provides no real advantage over a guilty sentence and· may even harm the defendant
because of greater reluctance to release the defendant. 160 If the
GBMI verdict reduces the potential benefit of arguing insanity
at trial, then it may also inhibit the use of independent experts
because the expert has even less of a chance of persuading the
fact finder to find the defendant NGRI than when the GBMI
verdict is not available.
f. Summary- Even though in some cases defense counsel
has a clear duty to pursue the insanity defense, counsel retains
and frequently uses substantial discretion not to refer cases to the Forensic Center. When the Center returns a finding of criminal responsibility, the pressures to continue pursuing the insanity defense diminish. The difficulties faced in presenting and
winning an insanity defense come into play as defense counsel
decides whether to prepare and argue an insanity defense. The
157. Attorney H at 3. Michigan's GBMI verdict has been criticized as ineffective because it has not accomplished the legislative goals of reducing the number of NGRI verdicts and providing treatment for mentally ill defendants found criminally responsible.
Project, supra note 65, at 104. Adjudication of the defendant as NGRI has not led to the
expected medical treatment. Petrella, Benedek, Bank & Packer, Examining the Application of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 254, 258 (1985). In contrast, some commentators believe that at least some defendants who are not mentally ill and who might have been erroneously found NGRI, have
received GBMI verdicts, preventing their premature discharge based on their having
been found not mentally ill shortly after conviction. Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66,
at 85. Despite this controversy, the GBMI verdict presents the fact finder with an alternative to the NGRI verdict in particular cases.
158. Attorney G at 6; Attorney I at 2; Clinician A at 2, 7; Clinician E at 5. But see
Project, supra note 65, at 84 n.33. Commentators and at least two appellate cases have
raised the issue of abuse of the GBMI verdict by juries that compromise between guilty
and NGRI by finding the defendant GBMI, but such abuse has not been shown. Id.
159. Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 2; Clinician F at 3.
160. Attorney B at 3; see Blunt & Stock, supra note 148, at 66: "(B]eing found GBMI
may actually be detrimental since it can interfere with the prisoner's chances of being
accepted into ancillary programs because of the label of 'mental illness.' " The former
Executive Director of Michigan Fo•ensic Services reported that many defendants do not
want mental illness on their records because parole boards may be hesitant to release
them. Project, supra note 65, at 102 n.134.
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effect is a radical reduction from the number of cases that could
enter the system for preparing an insanity defense to the number that actually enter and fully use the system, and then again
to the number that result in NGRI verdicts. The reduction process eases the demand for public payment for psychiatric expert
assistance, despite the relatively few restrictions the enacting
statute places on access to the system.
·
2. Adequacy of service- Michigan does not have formal
standards for assessing the quality and adequacy of psychiatric ·
expert service. 161 Although the data do not point to specific cases
where inferior service resulted in a clearly erroneous determination of legal sanity, the data do indicate that limited financial
support sometimes undermines the utility of the service.
Problems arise when counties do not allocate sufficient funds
and when trial courts limit fees, under the "reasonable fee" language of the statute, 162 to amounts too low to attract effective
experts or to secure appropriate expert time.
The amount paid the independent expert varies by county,
court, and case. Some counties rely on a standard fee and allow
the trial court to authorize additional payments. Some courts
readily grant additional fees on request; others do not. 163 In one
major urban county, the courts will not authorize payments
greater than those provided under a standard fee schedule unless the case requires extraordinary effort. 16" Not surprisingly,
court personnel and psychiatric experts disagree over the application of that standard. 1611
The psychiatric experts take a variety of approaches to setting
fees in indigent insanity defense cases. They may work for a reduced fee, use a fixed fee system instead of their usual practice
of billing by the hour, or complete the work they think is necessary and then petition for extra money, not knowing whether
they will receive it. 166
The standard fee established in several counties-$300 for
preparation and $150 per day for trial time in Wayne_ County,
161. The State Appellate Defender's Office, which assists indigent defendants appealing trial court decisions, has not handled cases raising this issue. Attorney L at 5.
162. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987).
163. Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 2-4; Attorney H at 1; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K
at 2; Attorney L at 5; Clinician A at 3; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 1, 4-5.
164. Gish interview, supra note 96.
165. Attorney F at 2-3; Clinician E at 1-2;
166. Attorney B at 4; Attorney H at 2; Attorney M at 3; Clinician C at 5; Clinician E
at 2; Clinician F at 1, 6.
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for example187-is too low to pay for the number of independent
expert hours often required to prepare adequately an insanity
defense. 188 When the defense is unable to get the trial court to
approve additional fees, the defendant receives inferior services
unless the expert adjusts only his charges and not his time
commitment.
Based on its review of Michigan cases, the Forensic Center
confirms the view expressed in Ake that a defense expert's assistance can be critical to an insanity defense. The Forensic Center
found that expert testimony is essential for the defendant to secure an NGRI verdict when the Forensic Center has found the
defendant criminally responsible. 189 An expert's persuasiveness
influences the outcome 170 and depends on such factors as competence, general expertise, prior experience, and the extent and
quality of evaluation and preparation for the case. 171 Limited
fees tempt the expert to restrict the preparation of the case to
the point of impairing the presentation of the insanity
defense. 172
Attorneys and clinicians did not describe established standards for expert time, but they did estimate ranges based on the
relative difficulty and complexity of the cases' legal insanity issues.173 The simplest cases might require a total of three hours
167. Interview with Mr. Dan Rutger, Deputy Court Administrator, City of Detroit
Recorder's Court (Apr. 14, 1987). Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law
Reform.
168. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
169. See Clark & Howard, supra note 117; see also Bank & Poythress, supra note 52.
170. Bank & Poythress, supra note 52, at 174. Jurors interviewed after a highly publicized murder trial where the only defense was insanity indicated that the case rested on
the experts, but that they found the defense doctor unconvincing, if not offensive. Forensic Center clinicians testified for the prosecution. The jury rejected the insanity defense.
Cain & Smith, Bailey Faces Life in Prison, Ann Arbor News, Oct. 2, 1986, at Al, col. 4,
A4, col. 1. Shortly thereafter, the same expert testified for the same defendant at a bench
trial for a second murder. The trial judge found the defendant guilty of second degree
murder and then chastised the expert as a publicity seeker. The court called the expert's
testimony "more theatre than substance." As many as twenty other experts refused to
take the case. Gave, Bailey Guilty of 2d Murder, Det. News, Nov. 21, 1986, at lB, col. 5.
171. Attorney B at 4, 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney H at 1; Attorney K at 2; Clinician A at 6, 9-10; Clinician B at 4; Clinician D at 5.
172. Attorney G at 1-2, 8; Clinician A at 3, 6; Clinician B at 5-7; Clinician D' at 6;
Clinician F at 5.
173. The time spent by the expert to prepare and present his evaluation of the defendant will vary with the complexity of the case and the resources available to pay the
expert. Attorneys and experts provided estimates of the time they would like to have for
psychiatric assistance and the amount usually needed based on previous experience.
They had the following comments.
Although Attorney B has cases that require as little as one hour for evaluation, contested cases can use at least 10 hours of expert time for pretrial preparation. Trial testimony can take a full day. Attorney B at 3-4. According to Attorney C, in some cases the
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for investigation, report preparation, and consultation with
counsel. Trial testimony requires additional time. Assuming no
unanticipated procedural or substantive difficulties, in major,
complex cases, estimates for time spent outside of court ranged
from six to twelve hours for evaluation, report preparation, and
consultation. Some cases require more time. Using eight hours as
a crude measure of the amount of pretrial time required for expert services, and a typical fee of $100 per hour, 174 the defense
would need at least $800 jtJ,st for preparation. Restricting the exexpert will require up to 20 interview sessions with the defendant. Attorney C at 1-2.
Attorney D believes that pretrial preparation requires at least six to 10 hours, and trial
testimony can extend up to five hours. Sometimes the expert needs to spend even more
time getting ready for trial. Initial interviews just to establish whether the insanity defense has any potential in a particular case will use one hour in addition to the expert's
travel time incurred when the defendant is incarcerated and the government does not
allow the expert to interview the defendant at the expert's office. Attorney D at 1, 3-4. In
a 1986 murder case involving an indigent defendant, Attorney G used 12 hours of expert
time, but would have preferred 25 or more hours. Attorney G at 1-2. Clinician A noted
that some cases require only two hours of preparation, whereas others require six. Clinician A at 10. The Forensic Center may put in as little as three hours on some cases, but
six to eight hours is closer to normal. At least one case required 36-48 hours of Forensic
Center clinician time. Clinician B at 4-7. Clinician C usually spends six hours preparing a
case and additional time testifying. Clinician C at 5-6. According to Clinician F, two to
three hours of work is inadequate. At the time of the interview, he had already put 13
hours into a vexing murder case and anticipated at least 16 more hours for pretrial preparation. Clinician F at 6. Judge A expects the expert to put at least three to four hours
into evaluating the defendant.
174. Psychiatrists typically charge $100-$150 per hour and psychologists $65-$100 per
hour. Attorney B at 4; Attorney D at 1; Clinician A at 10; Clinician F at 1. There are a
few forensic psychiatrists who may charge twice the average hourly rate. Clinician F at 1.
A few experts use a flat fee of $1000 to $1500 when they spend an entire day working on
an insanity defense case, such as when they must travel to a distant part of the state.
Attorney D at 2; Clinician F at 1. Some experts reduce their fees for indigent clients.
Attorney B at 4; Attorney M at 3; Clinician C at 5-6; Clinician E at 1-3. For cases raising
the insanity defense, some experts charge a fixed fee, even if the defendant is not indigent. Attorney F at 1-2; Clinician C at 5-6.
According to Attorney B, insanity defense cases typically cost $500-$1000 for the expert's evaluation and preparation time and $500-$1000 for the expert's time to testify at
trial. Attorney B at 3-4. Five-figure fees are not uncommon in retained cases. Attorney C
at 1-2. During the interview, Clinician F estimated that his fee for a pending murder case
might reach $10,000. Clinician F at 6. Attorney K believes that an expert will need about
$2000 to do a good job. He recently had a court turn down a request for $1200 to retain a
psychiatrist with expertise in Post-Vietnam Stress Syndrome. An indigent in Ingham
County recently received $2500 to pay for psychiatric assistance. Clinician B at 4. Alternatively, Judge A thinks that an insanity case can be adequately handled for $500. Judge
A at 2. Attorney M concurs in this judgment, and argues that the $300 for preparation
and $150 per day for testimony paid by Wayne County is sufficient, possibly because he
expects experts to adjust their fees downward for indigent clients. Attorney M at 1, 3.
Others disagree, directly stating that $300 will not pay for enough time for the expert to
do an adequate job. Attorney K at 2-3; Clinician B at 5; Clinician C at 5-6; Clinician F at
5. The examples of the fees charged in particular cases, and consideration of the number
of hours required by these cases in light of the typical hourly fee charged by experts,
confirm that assessment.
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pert to a standard fee of $300, for example, will not pay for an
adequate amount of service unless the expert drastically modifies his normal billing rates. Some cases will require trial court
generosity when calculating a reasonable fee. 176
Low fees and uneven reimbursement practices reinforce other
factors that limit the available pool of experts. 176 Some psychiatrists do not want to get involved because of their discomfort
with the courtroom role and the contentious, and sometimes humiliating, character of cross-examination. 177 In some regions of
Michigan, defense attorneys have trouble finding doctors experienced enough to present a credible case to the jury. 178 Using
experts from the small group of well-known and generally
respected defense experts may not solve the problem because
those experts' reputations as defense doctors are sometimes used
to discredit them. 179
The occasional inability to secure the services of competent
specialists and funding inadequate to support sufficient preparation can impair the quality of the defense presentation. Certain
experts, often those with the most experience in forensic psychiatry, are more persuasive and skilled at presenting the case to
the jury. Additionally, preparation is crucial to an effective presentation.180 The quality of the expert's participation and presentation of the insanity defense can influence the outcome of
the case. 181 Impediments to expert performance can diminish
the probability of obtaining an NGRI verdict, although deficiencies may not reach the level of incompetence necessary to implicate the prejudice standard used to assess claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 182 Even in Michigan's liberal system, the
defendant faces built-in financial impediments and judicial restrictions that can seriously reduce the quality of service.
175. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
176. Attorney A at 5; Attorney D at 1; Attorney Eat 4-5; Attorney Fat 1-2; Attorney
H at 2; Attorney I at 3, 8; Attorney K at 2; Attorney L at 5; Clinician A at 1; Clinician B
at 5, 7; Clinician C at 6; Clinician D at 5; Clinician E at 1-3; Clinician F at 2. But see
Attorney M at 1 (having no problems getting the expert he wants for indigent cases).
177. Attorney E at 4; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 2.
178. Attorney K at 2.
179. Attorney A at 5; Attorney B at 6; Attorney E at 3; Attorney I at 3-4; Attorney K
at 6. But cf. Attorney C at 3 (finding reputation as defense doctor of little concern).
180. Attorney B at 4, 6; Attorney C at 2-3; Attorney D at 1, 5; Attorney E at 4;
Attorney F at 2; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney H at 1, 2; Attorney I at 8; Attorney K at 2;
Clinician A at 8; Clinician B at 4-5; Clinician F at 2; see supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
181. Attorney G at 3-4; Attornev K at 2; Clinician B at 4-5; Clinician E at 4; Clinician
Fat 3-4; Banks & Poythress, supra note 52; see supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
182. Attorney F at 4; see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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Threshold Need Test for Psychiatric Expert Assistance

Michigan grants the indigent defendant access to independent
psychiatric assistance without applying a threshold need test to
establish that legal sanity is likely to be a legitimate issue at
trial. 183 The absence of such a test eliminates the possibility of
appeals based on judicial misapplication. 184 The defendant
avoids the denial of access to psychiatric assistance, and the
state avoids the costs and delays of appeals, which may not
change the adjudicative result. 1811
Without a need test, the defense has substantial discretion in
securing Forensic Center evaluation and the services of an independent psychiatric expert. The factors that discourage use of
the insanity defense and independent experts screen out cases
just as a threshold need test might 186 and do not require direct
trial court intervention. 187 The screening process protects the
public from unwarranted use of the service and wasteful expenditure of public funds. In Washtenaw County, the Public Defender's Office uses its own expert witness budget for psychiatric
assistance without court involvement, 188 assuming responsibility
for honest use of the money. 189 Once again, the defendant does
not risk an erroneous judicial determination of need, and the
public does not face the additional cost and delay of appeals
based on Ake.
Michigan's system may allow some defendants to use the Forensic Center and an independent expert where a court would
not allow access to publicly paid assistance. 190 But the financial
costs must be weighed against the potential litigation costs of an
appeal and the cost to a defendant of an erroneous need test
decision. 191 These costs are ·especially high in cases where the
psychiatric evaluations might have enabled the defendant to obtain an NGRI verdict or a prosecutorial compromise. 192 Forensic
Center data and information from several counties suggest that
the costs of providing the service without employing a need test
183. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987).
184. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
185. Attorney E at 5-8; Attorney F at 4; Attorney I at 8; Judge A at 3; see supra
notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 102-26, 143-44, 147-49 & 152-60 and accompanying text.
187. Attorney B at 4; Attorney C at 2; Clinician A at 7; Judge A at 3-4.
188. Attorney D at 2, 6.
189. Judge A at 6-7.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
191. Attorney I at 5; Judge A at 3-4.
192. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.

936

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:3

have not overwhelmed the public treasury and pale in comparison with the nonmonetary interests of the defendant. 193
Liberal access to expert services has little chance of leading to
NGRI verdicts in fundamentally meritless cases. 104 The factors
that discourage using the expert service system in weak cases
prevent an NGRI verdict in fabricated insanity defense cases. 1911
Michigan's experience seems to be that NGRI verdicts result either when the experts agree or have a good faith disagreement.196 A need test to keep cases away from a jury because of
fear that defense experts might persuade the jury wrongly to
find the defendant NGRI embodies an attack on the insanity
defense itself and an unwillingness to accept the outcomes of the
fact-finding process. 197
When the defense requests funds beyond the standard fee
schedules to pursue evaluation and preparation, the trial court
can subject the request to careful review or rely on the expert's
and defense counsel's good faith. Some courts appear to use a
good faith test at this point, a practice that roughly conforms to
the recommendations of critics of the threshold need test approach.198 The indigent defendant has had the benefit of at least
one completely independent psychiatric evaluation, something
that Ake does not always require. The trial court controls further use of public funds, without the danger of completely and
erroneously depriving the defendant of constitutionally mandated access to psychiatric assistance.
C.

Choice of Expert

Ake permits states to limit the defendant's choice of psychiatric expert, 199 whereas Michigan allows the defendant to supplement the required Forensic Center examination with evaluation
by any qualified expert at public expense. 200 The free choice of
193. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
194. Attorney A at 6; Attorney B at 1; Attorney C at 6; Attorney E at 2-3; Attorney G
at 7-9; Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 5, 9; Clinician A at 7-9; Clinician C at 3; Clinician
E at 4-5; Clinician F at 3, 5-6; see supra notes 102-26, 143-44, 147-49 & 152-60 and
accompanying text.
195. See supra note 194.
196. Clinician A at 7; Clinician B at 7.
197. L. COLEMAN, supra note 52, at 1-21, 45, 52-64.
198. Attorney B at 1, 5; Attorney C at 2; Clinician A at 8; Decker, supra note 34, at
615; Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1360.
199. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
200. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987).
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expert balances the influence of the Forensic Center and protects the defendant in situations where the attitude and skill of
the defense expert can influence the success of the insanity
plea.201
All defendants pleading insanity must undergo Forensic
Center evaluation, and the Center has the reputation of being
prosecution oriented. 202 Defense attorneys attribute this perspective, and possibly the Center's high rate of findings of criminal responsibility, to such factors as conscious hostility toward
the defense position, the subtle biasing effects of state employment, the institutional work environment, or honest scientific
disposition and perspective. 203 Forensic Center supporters argue
that Center clinicians are well-experienced in forensic psychiatry
and careful in their evaluations. They contend that low incidence of not criminally responsible evaluations results from the
rarity of mental illness in the population and the rigors of the
insanity test, not from bias. 20" They also point out that Forensic
Center clinicians are employed by the State Department of
Mental Health, which is not a prosecuting agency, and that state
employees, such as the Appellate Defenders, can be strong defense advocates. 2011
After Forensic Center evaluation, the defense can select any
qualified experts, including those with reputations as defenseoriented experts, to complete an independent evaluation. 208 Experts are not equally capable, a potentially significant factor
when presenting the insanity defense. 207 Michigan's program
does not force a defendant to select the independent expert from
a set of generally inferior forensic psychiatrists, although funding limitations might have that effect. 208 Judicial hostility toward some psychiatric experts, sometimes manifested through
201. Attorney B at 6; Attorney C at 2-3; Attorney F at 2; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney
Hat I; Attorney I at 8; Attorney Kat 2; Clinician A at 6-7; Clinician Bat 4; Clinician D
at 5; Clinician E at 1; Clinician F at 1-2; Judge A at 1; see supra text accompanying
notes 180-82.
202. Attorney B at 2, 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 5; Attorney E at 4; Attorney
K at 1; Attorney M at 2; Clinician A at 2; Clinician C at 1; Clinician D at_ 4; Judge A at 2.
203. See authorities cited supra note 202.
204. Attorney E at 3-4; Attorney I at 3-4; Clinician A at 2; Clinician C at 1.
205. Attorney E at 3-4.
206. Attorney B at 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 5; Attorney E at 3-4; Attorney I
at 3-4; Attorney K at 1-2; Clinician A at 8; Clinician B at 2; Clinician C at 1; Clinician E
at 5; Judge A at 2; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987); see also
supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
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reluctance to honor fee requests, 209 however, conflicts with the
statutory preference for free choice of expert.
The generosity of Michigan's system raises an alternative concern. Does the defendant's ability to seek out a defense-oriented
expert distort the adjudicatory process by encouraging unfounded pro-defense evaluations and contributing to patently
erroneous NGRI acquittals? 210 Not surprisingly, defense attorneys and experts deny that they distort either the facts of the
case or the fact-finding process. 211 Prosecution interests adopt a
less generous view of the behavior of defense experts, although
they admit that the leading defense experts are honest in their
recommendations and that the defense community generally
plays things straight. 212
Several factors constrain expert behavior and protect the factfinding process. Defense-oriented experts have recommended
against an insanity defense because of the results of their evaluations of defendants in addition to strategic grounds. 213 Raising
the insanity defense may link the nature of the crime to the de~
fendant's psychiatric history, inflaming jury worries about a
"maniac" walking the streets. 214 Advocacy of marginal cases
jeopardizes an expert's credibility, resulting in judicial distrust
and fee approval problems. 2111 Winning becomes an even more
remote possibility than usual, hurting the expert's track record
and making defense attorneys wary of using that expert. 216 Supporting weak cases opens the expert to attacks for his pro-de209. Clinician F at 4.
210. Attorney I at 4; Clinician F at 3; see supra note 52 and accompanying text; see
also Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 81 n.32 (citing a 1978 report claiming that
80% of those found NGRI are not mentally ill).
211. Attorney C at 6; Attorney D at 4, 6; Attorney G at 8-11; Clinician E at 4-5;
Clinician F at 3-4.
212. Attorney E at 4; Attorney I at 3; Clinician A at 6, 8; Clinician B at 4; Clinician C
at 4; Clinician D at 3.
213. Attorney D at 2; Clinician E at 1, 4.
214. Clinician E at 4-5. This expert considered Ake's case an unlikely one for a successful insanity defense based on the nature of the crime. See supra text accompanying
notes 7-8; see also Clinician F at 3-4. This expert said that in some notorious cases the
fact finder will want some retribution regardless of the defendant's apparent mental
problems. With regard to a highly publicized southeastern Michigan case that was in
progress on the date of the interview-involving the abduction, sexual abuse, and killing
of a 13-year-old boy by a young man with a history of mental health problems, treatment, and at least one similar offense-this expert viewed the defendant as not having a
chance of obtaining an NGRI verdict. The defendant was found legally sane. See supra
note 170.
215. Attorney B at 1; Attorney I at 7; see supra note 170.
216. Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 9; Clinician C at 3-4; Clinician E
at 5, 6; Clinician F at 3.
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fense orientation and poor prior performance, 217 adding to the
discomfort of testifying. 218 Finally, generally limited fees stifle
any financial incentive to promote weak cases. 219
Jury hostility to the insanity defense also constrains the freely
chosen expert from subverting the fact-finding process. 220 A blatantly pro-defense expert has a small chance of convincing the
jury to find the defendant not criminally responsible in a weak
case, especially when opposed by the Forensic Center. 221 Although an occasional meritless NGRI verdict may slip
through, 222 prosecutors, defense attorneys, and clinicians all tend
to see this risk as minimal. 223 Instead, they maintain that the
insanity defense will only succeed when there is some legitimate
substantive basis for the defense. 224
In close cases, the independent expert's pro-defense orientation works in favor of an NGRI verdict. 2211 The prosecution may
consider an NGRI verdict wrong in some of these cases. 228 Yet,
an NGRI verdict requires the defense to overcome adverse Forensic Center testimony and convince a skeptical fact finder. 227
That result demands a credible basis for arguing the defense. 228
These NGRI verdicts hardly amount to gross distortions of the
fact-finding process, especially in an adversary system. 229

D.

Role of the Expert

The Michigan system permits expert partisanship and only restricts the expert's role by requiring a written evaluation and
recommendation. 230 Despite fears that partisan experts distort
the fact-finding process, 231 formal and informal elements of the
217. Attorney A at 5; Attorney D at 1, 5-6; Attorney Eat 3-4; Attorney I at 2.
218. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
219. Clinician E at 5; see supra notes 162-68 & 173-75 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 82 & 151-56 and accompanying text.
222. Attorney I at 4-5; Clinician A at 8; Clinician Cat 4; see supra notes 210-11 and
accompanying text.
223. Attorney Eat 3; Attorney G at 11-12; Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 4-5; Clinician A at 7; Clinician B at 6; Clinician C at 2-3; Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 3-5.
224. Attorney K at l; Clinician A at 7-9; Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 4-5.
225. Attorney D at 5; Clinician B at 3; see supra note 148.
226. Attorney I at 8; Clinician A at 8.
227. Clinician C at 3; see supra notes 82 & 151-56 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
229. Clinician A at 8; Clinician Bat 8; Clinician Cat 1-2; see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 40, § l.6(a)-(c).
230. See M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(6)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1987).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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Michigan system suppress the influence of expert partisanship
and prevent experts from leading juries to NGRI verdicts in
groundless cases. The processes that minimize the impact of free
choice of expert on adjudicatory result also limit the effects of
expert partisanship. 232
The Forensic Center, which many consider prosecution oriented,233 evaluates all defendants pleading insanity. 2a. When the
Center evaluates the defendant as not criminally responsible,
the prosecutor rarely contests that conclusion, and the issue of
expert partisanship becomes irrelevant. This covers the vast majority of NGRI verdicts in Michigan. 2311
In contested cases, the partisan defense expert usually faces a
Forensic Center clinician. The Center's credibility with judges
and juries and potential image as a disinterested party, 236 balances the partisanship of the independent expert. In indigent
cases, limited funding prevents massive battles of the experts
that might overwhelm the jury. 237 A partisan expert has a great
deal of trouble overcoming jury skepticism even when the facts
make the insanity defense highly plausible. 238 Although partisan
experts have probably influenced verdicts favorably for the defendant, outlandish results appear rare. 239
Participation by partisan experts may add time and cost to
the trial. Their participation may force the fact finder to sort
through conflicting testimony from the independent expert and
the presumably neutral Forensic Center. The Michigan system
presumes that no single psychiatric expert will necessarily describe ultimate truth and that the fact-finding process in in232. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
234. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(2) (West Supp. 1987).
235. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 148.
237. Caplan, supra note 79, at 51-52. The doctors who testified for the government in
its case against John Hinckley charged over $300,000. Hinckley's doctors charged about
one-half of that amount. Id. at 59. "To quiet the popular concern, among psychiatrists as
much as among others, that doctors have too much sway in insanity trials," bills introduced in the House and Senate after the Hinckley case "proposed to prevent [doctors]
from testifying about the ultimate question before the jury." Id. at 75; Attorney D at 4
(noting that attorneys in Washtenaw County Public Defender's Office might use two experts in a capital case).
Although FED. R. Evrn. 704(b) has been recently amended to reduce the influence of
experts over juries, there is still a problem in most insanity cases. The majority of these
cases are tried at the state level, and there is no indication that Michigan will adopt this
amended version. Furthermore, expert testimony will remain influential because the expert can provide evidence that leads to only one ultimate conclusion.
238. Attorney G at 5; Clinician F at 3; see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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sanity cases is best served by exposing the fact finder to competing versions of truth. Apparently, open contests to determine
that truth have not made judges and juries so vulnerable to expert manipulation that these contests jeopardize the integrity of
the adjudicatory process.
CONCLUSION

Michigan provides indigent defendants with publicly paid psychiatric assistance without imposing the limitations permitted
by the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma. Defendants have access to the system without having to satisfy a
threshold need test, they can hire any qualified expert they
want, and the expert may serve as a defense consultant. Several
factors, however, channel services to appropriate cases and limit
the adjudicatory impact of Michigan's policy choices. Defense
attorneys play a critical role in determining whether to use the
system at all and whether to pursue the insanity defense all the
way to trial. These attorneys take into account in their decisionmaking the multiple factors that make a successful insanity defense unlikely. Additionally, the Forensic Center evaluates every
defendant who indicates an intent to plead insanity. The Center
typically finds the defendant criminally responsible, and that
finding discourages both further defense pursuit of an insanity
argument and decisions for the defendant by the judge or jury
when the defendant does challenge the Forensic Center's findings. The screening process engaged in by defense attorneys, the
Forensic Center, and the fact finder discourage use of all the elements of support made available by the psychiatric assistance
system. When a defendant persists with a~ insanity defense, despite the relative lack of merit of that defense, the chances for
adjudicatory vindication for the defendant appear quite slim.
Fear of disruption of the adjudicatory process seems unfounded.
In some situations, funding difficulties prevent the psychiatric
assistance program from fully satisfying 'the needs of the indigent defendant. The bulk of the State's money goes to supporting the Forensic Center. Although the Center evaluates each defendant, the Center does not directly serve defendant interests.
Instead, the funding for defense experts that comes through
county governments is inconsistent. Adequate psychiatric expert
service simply costs more than some counties and courts provide
in some cases. Michigan has already passed legislation approving
state funding of trial courts and support services, such as psychi-
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atric experts. Unfortunately, the Legislature has never funded
this program. Affirmative steps in that direction, providing for
adequate state funding and administrative controls, would set
the stage for rectifying implementation problems in Michigan's
generally successful program for providing psychiatric expert assistance to indigent defendants pleading insanity.

-Paul Zisla

